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Combining universal beauty and
cultural context in a unifying model
of visual aesthetic experience
Christoph Redies*
Experimental Aesthetics Group, Institute of Anatomy I, University of Jena School of Medicine, Jena University Hospital, Jena,
Germany
In this work, I propose a model of visual aesthetic experience that combines
formalist and contextual aspects of aesthetics. The model distinguishes between
two modes of processing. First, perceptual processing is based on the intrinsic
form of an artwork, which may or may not be beautiful. If it is beautiful, a beauty-
responsive mechanism is activated in the brain. This bottom–up mechanism is universal
amongst humans; it is widespread in the visual brain and responsive across visual
modalities. Second, cognitive processing is based on contextual information, such
as the depicted content, the intentions of the artist or the circumstances of the
presentation of the artwork. Cognitive processing is partially top–down and varies
between individuals according to their cultural experience. Processing in the two
channels is parallel and largely independent. In the general case, an aesthetic experience
is induced if processing in both channels is favorable, i.e., if there is resonance in the
perceptual processing channel (“aesthetics of perception”), and successful mastering
in the cognitive processing channel (“aesthetics of cognition”). I speculate that this
combinatorial mechanism has evolved to mediate social bonding between members
of a (cultural) group of people. Primary emotions can be elicited via both channels and
modulate the degree of the aesthetic experience. Two special cases are discussed.
First, in a subset of (post-)modern art, beauty no longer plays a prominent role. Second,
in some forms of abstract art, beautiful form can be enjoyed with minimal cognitive
processing. The model is applied to examples of Western art. Finally, implications
of the model are discussed. In summary, the proposed model resolves the seeming
contradiction between formalist perceptual approaches to aesthetic experience, which
are based on the intrinsic beauty of artworks, and contextual approaches, which
account for highly individual and culturally dependent aspects of aesthetics.
Keywords: experimental aesthetics, beauty, art, culture, painting, cognition, perception, emotion
Introduction
Research in the ﬁeld of experimental aesthetics has gained much momentum in recent years. The
roots of psychological research in aesthetics date back as far as to the 19th century (Fechner, 1876),
but the research tools to tackle scientiﬁc questions in the ﬁeld have become widely available to
the scientiﬁc community only during the last decade or so. For example, modern brain imaging
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methods have empowered studies on how aesthetic experience
correlates with the activation of brain regions in the human
observer (for reviews, see Avram et al., 2013; Ishizu and Zeki,
2013; Vessel et al., 2013; Vartanian and Skov, 2014) and advanced
computational methods permit the investigation of statistical
image properties that are associated with aesthetically pleasing
images (Datta et al., 2006; Redies et al., 2007b; Li and Chen, 2009;
Graham and Redies, 2010; Braun et al., 2013).
One major problem in modern experimental aesthetics is
that the subject of investigation, aesthetic experience, remains
ill-deﬁned. Artists and vision scientists alike have problems in
narrowing down what aesthetic experience exactly is. Similarly, at
the stimulus level, it remains unclear whether or not visual stim-
uli can have an intrinsic “signiﬁcant form,” which can elicit the
perception of beauty, as postulated by Bell (1914). If so, what is
the nature of this beautiful form? Although many attempts have
been made to deﬁne terms such as “artworks,” “aesthetics,” or
“beauty,” their precise meaning is elusive. Moreover, for diﬀer-
ent types of visual stimuli, for example for images of human faces
or bodies, landscapes and artworks, the same term may denote
diﬀerent things (Augustin et al., 2012). Despite the uncertainties,
there seems to be a general agreement in the ﬁeld that the scien-
tiﬁc study of aesthetic experience and of beautiful stimuli holds
great promise and may contribute signiﬁcantly to our under-
standing of human brain function and behavior (Jacobsen, 2006;
Chatterjee and Vartanian, 2014). In the present work, beauty
refers to the inherent property of a visual stimulus; aesthetic
refers to the subjective experience elicited by an artwork, or to
the neural processing in the brain relating to that experience.
Aesthetic experience consists of an intense feeling of pleasure,
which people can have when viewing beautiful stimuli such as
artworks. This general feeling should be distinguished frommore
domain-speciﬁc sensations of visual pleasure that are elicited, for
example, by attractive faces, the beauty of natural scenes or fash-
ionable clothing (see “Application of the Model to other Areas
and Domains of Aesthetics”). Note that the term aesthetic expe-
rience has been used diﬀerently in some psychological theories
to describe deeply moving and disrupting cognitive experiences
that cause psychological and emotional adjustments in an indi-
vidual’s lifetime; such experiences, which can evoke mental and
emotional growth, do not necessarily involve sensual beauty (for
example, see Lasher et al., 1983; Funch, 2007; Pelowski and Akiba,
2011).
In view of the many uncertainties in modern experimen-
tal aesthetics, models are crucial to develop testable research
hypotheses. Scientiﬁc models have a great inﬂuence on the types
of scientiﬁc studies asked. Current models in experimental aes-
thetics are inspired not only by scientiﬁc research, but also by
ideas emanating from other ﬁelds, such as philosophical aes-
thetics, art history and art critique. Over the last two millennia,
philosophers and art historians have reﬂected upon many of the
fundamental questions that are advanced in experimental aes-
thetics today. They have done so with conceptual vigor and at
great intellectual depth. On the one hand, this background has
the great advantage that scientists can tap into a vast array of
ideas about aesthetics. On the other hand, the proximity of exper-
imental aesthetics to the other disciplines harbors the risk that
experimental aesthetics emulates uncritically a narrow subset of
philosophical positions. As always in science, it is important to
keep an open mind in order to avoid being dogmatic about issues
that have not yet been subject to rigorous scientiﬁc examination.
Aim of the Proposed Model
At present, two major types of theories predominate in the sci-
entiﬁc literature on experimental aesthetics (for a review, see
Shimamura, 2014):
• Formalist theories propose that aesthetic experience relies on
one or several formal properties of visual stimuli, in particular
their intrinsic sensual beauty (Baumgarten, 1750; Bell, 1914;
for a review, see Dowling, 2014). It has been argued that pro-
cessing of beauty does not have to reach consciousness and
may be largely non-verbal. Moreover, the formal properties
are thought to be universal, i.e., they have the potential to
elicit an aesthetic experience in viewers across human cultures
and independent of the context of their creation (Bell, 1914).
A more modern version proposes that the universal properties
of artworks reﬂect basic mechanisms of human brain function
(Zeki, 1999a), such as eﬃcient coding principles (Redies, 2007).
• Contextual theories propose that aesthetic experience depends
on the intention of the artist and the circumstances, under
which the artwork was created and is displayed. Contextual
theories focus on deliberate processing of explicit information
that can be verbalized. Unlike image content, beauty plays only
a minor role, if any. Contextual and content-based theories of
art appreciation have been advanced in contemporary philo-
sophical aesthetics in particular (Goodman, 1968; Dickie, 1974;
Danto, 1981), as well as in empirical aesthetics (Jacobsen, 2006;
Bullot and Reber, 2013; Zeki, 2013). Some of these theories
focus on (post-)modern and contemporary art (Leder et al.,
2004; Gopnik, 2012).
Two other types of theories play less of a role in current
discussions in the ﬁeld of experimental aesthetics and are not
considered here in detail. First, mimetic theories stipulate that
artworks mimic views onto reality and that the beholder evaluates
the quality of artworks by howwell it resembles real-world scenes.
This idea cannot be applied to non-representational artworks.
Second, expressionist theories emphasize that artists convey their
feelings to the beholder through artworks and that it is the emo-
tional quality of an artwork that is of paramount importance for
aesthetic experience (for a review, see Shimamura, 2014). For a
discussion of the role of emotions in aesthetic appreciation, see
Section “Emotional Processing.”
Conceptual and formalist theories seem to contradict each
other at ﬁrst glance. On the one hand, some authors claim that
content and context alone determine aesthetic experience and
that, consequently, there is no intrinsic form in artworks that
is preferred across cultures (Danto, 1981; Leder et al., 2004;
Gopnik, 2012; Bullot and Reber, 2013; Zeki, 2013; Leder and
Nadal, 2014). On the other hand, models that focus on the uni-
versality of beauty largely neglect contextual factors (e.g., Bell,
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1914; Redies, 2007). However, as is common in science, aspects
of both types of ideas seem germane to the question of what con-
stitutes aesthetic experience, as pointed out by several researchers
(see, e.g., Berlyne, 1971; Chatterjee, 2011; Van de Cruys and
Wagemans, 2011; Sheridan and Gardner, 2012; Bullot and Reber,
2013; Graham, 2013; Mather, 2014). It remains unclear how the
two opposing views can be combined in an integrative conceptual
framework.
In the present work, I will present a unifying model of aes-
thetic experience, which integrates aspects of contextual and
formalist theories. Themodel incorporates perceptual factors that
determine the processing of beautiful form, as well as the cog-
nitive processing of contextual variables that aﬀect personal aes-
thetic preferences. It also accounts for aesthetic episodes elicited
by (post-)modern art and by non-beautiful art. The model is
dynamic and can explain changes in the reception of artworks
over time. The model was primarily developed for the visual
domain, but possible application to the other senses will be dis-
cussed also (see “Application of the Model to other Areas and
Domains of Aesthetics”).
The Model
Figure 1 depicts my model of visual aesthetic experience. A brief
outline of the model is provided in the legends to Figure 1.
Following previous proposals (Sheridan and Gardner, 2012;
Shimamura, 2014), the present model is based on the triad of
cognition, perception and emotions (Chatterjee and Vartanian,
2014). Processing in the perceptual channel and cognitive chan-
nel takes place independently and in parallel; for aesthetic expe-
rience to be induced, successful processing in both channels
is necessary (see “Joint Activation of Perceptual and Cognitive
Channels,” which also provides examples of how the model works
for diﬀerent cases of aesthetic and non-aesthetic experiences). In
Section “Predominant Activation of One Channel,” I will describe
two special cases where processing in one of the two channels
dominates the other. The third component of the model, emo-
tions, can modulate the extent of the aesthetic experience (see
“Emotional Processing”).
External Information
The external factors of the model comprise the form and con-
tent of the stimulus as well as the context of its creation and
presentation (Figure 1).
Stimulus
The stimulus in the model is a visual display of an artwork or
an object, a visual scene or a visual pattern. In general, images of
artworks are well demarcated from their visual surround. Often,
a frame is used to enhance this boundary (Redies and Gross,
FIGURE 1 | Model of aesthetic experience. The model distinguishes
between external information (see “External Information”) and its internal
representation in the nervous system of the art beholder or the artist (see
“Internal Representation”). The external information consists of the stimulus
(artwork) and the context, under which it was created or is viewed. From the
left to the right, we proceed to the encoding of information in the nervous
system. The arrows indicate the forward flow of information. Note that
feedback loops and top-down processing, which take place in the cognitive
processing stream in particular, are not indicated in the diagram. Stimulus
form is encoded by mechanisms of sensory perception (see “Perceptual
Coding and Processing”). The beholder gains cognitive information about the
content and context of the artwork not only by viewing it but also by means
of communication, for example, in a verbal dialog with another person or by
reading a text (see “Cognitive Coding and Processing”). In addition,
contextual information that has been obtained previously may be retrieved
from memory. The initial encoding of stimulus form and context is then
followed by further information processing in the brain. The thick arrows in
the model represent two different channels of information processing:
perceptual processing of form (green arrows at the top) and cognitive
processing of content and context (purple arrows at the bottom). If
processing in both channels is favorable (see “Joint Activation of Perceptual
and Cognitive Channels”), i.e., if there is resonance in perceptual processing
(aesthetics of perception), and mastering of cognitive processing (aesthetics
of cognition), aesthetic experience is induced (see “Aesthetic Experience”).
Emotions can be elicited via both channels and modulate the degree of the
aesthetic experience (see “Emotional Processing”).
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2013). Some visually pleasing stimuli, for example large vista
views of beautiful landscapes, ﬁll the entire visual ﬁeld of the
beholder’s eye. In any case, the stimulus of interest is usually
viewed at the center of gaze, which falls onto the fovea of the
retina, from where retinal ganglion cells project nerve ﬁbers to
the visual centers in the brain. About 80–90% of retinocortical
connections and the subsequent processing in the visual cortex
are devoted to the fovea so that peripheral vision contributes rela-
tively little to processing in the brain. The stimulus may be static,
or moving, such as in videos or dance. Information of stimulus
movement is encoded already at the retinal level and is con-
veyed to the brain along a specialized channel (Wurtz andKandel,
2000a).
Form
The form of the stimulus refers to how something is depicted
in an image while image content refers to what is depicted. For
example, an image may depict a bowl of fruit, which can assume
diﬀerent forms; it may be sketched by thin gray pencil lines, rep-
resented realistically in bright oil paint, outlined schematically
in a coarse woodcut print, or fragmented in a cubist painting.
Form includes both the local structure and the global (higher-
order) structure of an image. Local structure corresponds to
luminance or color and luminance contrast, lines edges, tex-
ture or shading cues that are present at a particular location of
an image. In a digital image, it describes the relation of pix-
els within a narrow region of an image. Global structure refers
to statistical regularities in large parts of the image or in the
entire image, for example the spatial frequency content of the
image, the kurtosis of its luminance values, overall complexity or
self-similarity.
Form and content of an image are not independent of each
other. For example, at the local level, an apple has a shiny,
unblemished surface that is diﬀerent from that of a hedgehog
(many spikes). Also at the global level, images with diﬀerent
content may diﬀer systematically in their higher-order statisti-
cal image properties. For example, images of most natural scenes
possess a scale-invariant spatial frequency (Fourier) spectrum
(Field, 1987; Tolhurst et al., 1992; Simoncelli and Olshausen,
2001) while images of printed text do not have such a scale-
invariant spectrum (Melmer et al., 2013).
Before asking whether artworks have a characteristic intrinsic
form or not, let us consider whether natural images and images
of artworks represent a special subset of images in general. It
has been argued that all natural images have a speciﬁc form and
constitute a minute subset of all possible images (Ruderman,
1994; Simoncelli and Olshausen, 2001; Geisler, 2008; Graham
and Field, 2009). For example, Graham and Field (2009) demon-
strated that the vast majority of digital images looks like white
noise, i.e., the gray values of each pixel appear more or less ran-
dom and do not relate to those of neighboring pixels in the image.
Humans cannot perceive any natural scenes or objects in white-
noise images. In digital images of natural scenes or objects, the
gray value of a given pixel is likely to be similar to that of the
immediately adjacent pixels, i.e., neighboring pixels are highly
correlated, because visual objects typically exhibit borders and
surfaces that extent in a contiguous fashion across parts of the
image. These statistical regularities in the pixel relations can be
expressed in terms such as the pairwise correlation, kurtosis,
collinearity, co-circularity etc. (Sigman et al., 2001; Simoncelli
and Olshausen, 2001; Geisler, 2008; Graham and Field, 2009).
The human visual system, in turn, is adapted in evolution and
development to process these regularities with high eﬃciency
and to extract biologically relevant information from them (see
below).
Evidently, humans create artworks and other visual displays
to be observed by humans. As a consequence, artworks are
not perceptually indistinct like white noise images, but artworks
resemble images of natural scenes or objects in that they have a
form or structure that can eﬀectively stimulate the human visual
system (Redies, 2007; Graham and Redies, 2010). In conclusion,
like natural images, most artworks likely tend toward a form
suited for human vision.
However, not all images created by humans for humans are
beautiful, just because they can stimulate some perceptual mech-
anism eﬃciently. For example, a bright red dot, yellow dot and
green dot placed in a vertical line and presented in isolation on
a dark background are excellent stimuli for our vision system,
but most people would concur that they look like a traﬃc light
that is not highly beautiful. Another example: In their paint-
ings, impressionist artists have focused on the stimulation of
color and shading mechanisms in vision, but not every paint-
ing produced in the impressionist style is highly beautiful. More
complex visual eﬀects have also been used in some speciﬁc types
of art. For example, in the peak shift eﬀect, animals respond
more strongly to exaggerated stimuli than to normal ones. This
principle has also been cited for the sexual features in some
types of Indian sculptures (Ramachandran and Hirstein, 1999).
Lastly, regular printed text is a stimulus that has been optimized
for reading but it is not necessarily beautiful (Melmer et al.,
2013).
In summary, the natural environment projects images with
particular statistical regularities onto the retina. These image
regularities are eﬃciently processed by specialized neural mech-
anisms in the visual system. We can thus expect that visual
artworks have speciﬁc image properties because they were cre-
ated so that their form can activate perceptual mechanisms
in the human visual system (Redies, 2007; Graham and Field,
2008; Graham and Redies, 2010). Therefore, both natural images
and artworks represent a subset of all images. The above con-
clusion does not help us, however, to decide whether beau-
tiful images possess a speciﬁc form and represent a sub-
set of all natural or man-made images. This question will
be addressed in Section “What is the Nature of the Beauty-
Responsive Mechanism and Which Stimulus Features Activate
It?”
Content and context
The content of an image refers to anything that can be recognized
by the viewer as persons, other natural or inanimate objects, and
their actions or relations to each other. Content may also refer to
emotional, social, political or philosophical concepts that artists
intend to convey though their artworks. In general, image content
can be made explicit, i.e., it enters consciousness as a meaningful
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interpretation of what we see, and it can be described in everyday
(non-technical) language in most cases.
I have no doubt whatsoever that cultural factors and the pre-
vious experience of the artists and the art viewer have a crucial
eﬀect on the depiction and interpretation of content in art-
works. In order to understand the meaning of artworks and the
intentions of the artist, the art viewer must have some under-
standing of the cultural and individual circumstances, under
which the artwork was created. As a consequence, the evalua-
tion of image content depends on the context of the artwork’s
creation. Likewise, the context of the presentation of an artwork
(e.g., museum, laboratory, or book) has an eﬀect on the aes-
thetic experience of the beholder (see, for example Gerger et al.,
2014). Both content and context are factors that are shaped by
the cultural environment and the individual experience of the
artist and the art viewer. Content-based and contextual features
that aﬀect aesthetic experience include familiarity, prototypical-
ity, novelty, originality, expertise, satisfaction, ambiguity, per-
sonal taste, interest, arousal, art-historical information, artistic
understanding, social status and ﬁnancial interests. A detailed
account on how these diverse explicit features can aﬀect the
creation of artworks and the aesthetic experience has been pub-
lished, for example, by Leder et al. (2004; modiﬁed in Leder and
Nadal, 2014) and by Jacobsen (2006) for diverse psychological
factors, and by Bullot and Reber (2013) for the art-historical
context.
Artistic style is another feature of artworks that is strongly
aﬀected by cultural context. Style is important not only for how
things are depicted in artworks but also for the subject matter
depicted. For example, 16th century medieval paintings make
use of a particular type of perspective, a limited set of colors
and usually depict religious subject matters. This style is diﬀerent
from, for example, expressionist paintings that are characterized
by wide variety of subject matters and emphasize the subjective
emotional experience of the artist. In general, stylistic matters are
subject to conscious decisions by the artist and depend largely on
cultural context.
Last but not least, diﬀerent techniques can be used to cre-
ate artworks (oil painting, watercolor, etching, woodcut, etc.).
Artistic styles have a large inﬂuence on which techniques artists
use, but artists may depict the same content by using diﬀerent
techniques. For example, Edvard Munch created several versions
of “The Scream” (oil painting, lithograph, and pastel drawing).
A particular technique may tend to come along with speciﬁc local
image properties, but these image properties do not by themselves
determine whether an image is beautiful because, in principle,
any technique can be used to create artworks.
Internal Representation
In the model, sensory coding and cognitive coding are deﬁned as
the translation of external information into neural activity and
they are a prerequisite for further information processing in the
brain. The form of external stimuli is encoded by mechanisms
of sensory perception that take place in the retina and repre-
sent, at the same time, the lowest stages of visual processing. The
other two features of external stimuli in the model, content, and
context, are encoded in the nervous system by cognitive coding,
but not necessarily through the visual channel alone (see above).
Once information is internally represented in the nervous sys-
tem, it is processed to extract and enhance relevant information.
Contextual information in particular is also stored in memory to
be retrieved later.
Perceptual Coding and Processing
Perceptual coding of form
From the retina to the primary visual cortex, speciﬁc local fea-
tures of visual images, for example, luminance contrast, color
contrast, edges, three-dimensional depth cues and movement in
visual scenes are detected and enhanced. To a large degree, the
underlying visual mechanisms are driven bottom–up, take place
automatically at lower stages of visual processing and are fast.
Sensory coding and basic processing are mediated by neuronal
mechanisms that are universal amongst humans; during the life-
time of an individual, thesemechanisms can bemodiﬁed by visual
experience to a limited degree under normal circumstances,
e.g., by adaptation (Wurtz and Kandel, 2000c).
Not all external signals can be encoded by the sensory systems.
For example, humans cannot perceive ultraviolet or infrared light
at the extremes of the spectrum of visible light. Consequently,
it would make little sense for an artist to paint an artwork with
ultraviolet color because nobody would be able to see it under
natural lighting conditions. By the same token, a completely
color-blind person will not be able to appreciate fully the artworks
of French impressionists or other colorful artworks. Moreover,
vision is an active process, by which the human visual system
extracts visual information based on attentional mechanisms. We
can assume that the perceptual mechanisms that enable us to
orient ourselves in our daily life represent an adaptation to the
visual structure of our natural environment during evolution
(for a review, see Simoncelli, 2003) and during an individual’s
lifetime. For example, movement is an important visual feature
and the human visual system possesses several mechanisms to
encode and process this particular aspect of visual information
with high eﬃciency and accuracy. Similarly, the preference for
particular colors helped our ancestors to survive better, proba-
bly because color vision proved useful in their search for food,
such as ripe fruit (for a review, see Palmer et al., 2013). The visual
system is thus composed of mechanisms that process visual infor-
mation in a particular fashion. Such mechanisms include, for
example, contrast enhancement of luminance and color, adap-
tation, movement-sensitive neural circuits, depth perception etc.
The modiﬁcation of visual information by the visual system can
be studied in numerous visual illusions that enable us to expe-
rience directly the diﬀerence between physical stimuli and our
perception of them.
In general, artists have a good intuitive or explicit knowledge
of how we perceive and how the brain processes visual infor-
mation. This knowledge allows them to create artworks that can
eﬃciently stimulate the retina and visual brain (Cavanagh, 2005).
Artists used some visual eﬀects in their works long before vision
scientists discovered them in their research. For at least a cen-
tury, there has been a very lively exchange between artists and
vision scientists on how we perceive the external world. This
mutual exchange has been beneﬁcial to both sides (Spillmann,
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 5 April 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 218
Redies Model of aesthetic experience
2007) and there are several scientiﬁc publications that describe
this exchange with abundant illustrations (Gregory et al., 1995;
Zeki, 1999b; Livingstone, 2002).
However, the illustration of a particular visual phenomenon
alone is not suﬃcient to create a visual artwork. Straightforward
displays of visual illusions, such as the Kanizsa (1955) triangle
(Figure 2A), can hardly be considered works of art. If artists
use such visual elements in their works, they usually do so in an
intricate and complex way that surpasses the simple illustration
of the visual phenomenon. For example, the Dutch artist M. C.
Escher used Penrose’s impossible staircase (Figure 2B; Penrose
and Penrose, 1958) in his 1960 lithograph “Klimmen en Dalen”
(Figure 2C). This lithograph is a work of art not only because it
illustrates a particular visual eﬀect, but also because of the over-
all artistic composition of the artwork. Note that the impossible
staircase constitutes only a small part of the artwork; its illusory
FIGURE 2 | Examples of visual effects (illusions). (A) Kanizsa’s (1955)
triangle. Note the bright and sharply demarcated illusory triangle that is
induced by spatially separate black circles (pac-mans) and the segmented
outlines of a triangle. (B) Impossible staircase (Penrose and Penrose, 1958).
This object is impossible in three-dimensional space because the steps
continuously descend or ascend. (C) A similar visual effect was used by M. C.
Escher in his artwork Klimmen en Dalen (1960). Note that the image showing
the isolated effect is not a beautiful artwork while Escher’s lithograph is (C). M.
C. Escher’s “Klimmen en Dalen” © 2015 The M.C. Escher Company – The
Netherlands (www.mcescher.com). All rights reserved. Used by permission.
nature is noticed after closer inspection of the people climbing
and descending the stairs and may provide an example of a cog-
nitive ‘aha’ eﬀect that artworks can elicit by cognitive mastering
(Lasher et al., 1983; Pelowski and Akiba, 2011; Muth and Carbon,
2013). The perceptual quality of this lithograph, however, stems
from the gestalt of the entire composition, not just from the
depiction of the staircase.
Vice versa, if scientists study special visual eﬀects that artists
use in their paintings, this endeavor should not be confused with
experimental aesthetics. Research in experimental aesthetics aims
to study the basis of aesthetic experience and its neural correlates,
whereas elementarymechanisms of visual perception are the sub-
ject of vision science in general. Studying general mechanisms of
visual perception may be useful and interesting to both scientists
and artists, but it does not help us to understand the diﬀerence
between ordinary visual stimuli and artworks.
Higher-level perceptual processing
It is well established that, at low levels of the visual system (up
to the primary visual cortex), information processing is pre-
dominantly local, i.e., it is restricted to small regions of the
retina (Wurtz and Kandel, 2000b). Local visual information, such
as luminance, color and movement, are passed along to the
visual cortex in separate channels. In the primary visual cortex,
this information is then mapped retinotopically onto the so-
called hypercolumns, which process local information from small
regions of the visual ﬁeld. In higher visual cortical areas beyond
the primary visual cortex, information is merged more and more
from larger regions of the visual ﬁeld to extract more global fea-
tures. At the same time, the higher visual cortical areas become
specialized in processing speciﬁc aspects of visual information,
for example, color in cortical area V4, movement in the medial
temporal cortical region, and faces in the fusiform gyrus (Wurtz
and Kandel, 2000b).
Assuming that correlates of the perception of beautiful form
exist, these ﬁndings bring up two questions: (1) Are the correlates
more likely to be found at lower or at higher levels of the visual
system? (2) In which of the diﬀerent visual channels or cortical
areas can we anticipate to encounter the correlates? The answer
to both questions is relatively straightforward.
First, there is strong evidence that the perception of beauti-
ful form depends, at least in part, on global image properties.
The commonly used term “composition” clearly refers to the
relation of visual elements (lines, edges, surfaces, etc.) across an
artwork. In a beautiful artwork, local elements are integrated into
an overall gestalt that pervades the entire artwork and puts each
pictorial element in perceptual relation to the other elements in
the artwork. As a consequence, the global integrity of an art-
work is paramount for the appreciation of its beauty. If beauty
were a purely local phenomenon, it would be possible to cut an
artwork into pieces and enjoy the pieces one by one on diﬀer-
ent days. Reassembling the pieces of an artwork randomly has
as much a deleterious eﬀect as has punching a sizable hole into
a painting. Even more detrimental would be to exchange parts
between diﬀerent paintings. Of course, such manipulations may
have an eﬀect not only on the form but also on the content of
an image, but one could think of options (e.g., for abstract art)
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that selectively aﬀect image formwithout changing image content
(McManus et al., 1993; Redies et al., 2015).
Second, it is even more evident that the perception of beauty
is not restricted to one particular mechanism of visual process-
ing. Rather, in the history of art, it has been shown over an over
again that beautiful artworks can be created in almost any style
and by using any variety and combination of visual eﬀects, for
example, color, luminance edges, depth cues, occlusion, move-
ment, adaptation, visual ambiguity, and so on. Related to this
variety of visual mechanisms, the material that can be used to cre-
ate beautiful objects seems limited only by practical constraints
but not by artistic ones. Consequently, neural mechanisms that
detect beauty in visual stimuli must be localized in most if not all
cortical regions that process visual information. While it is the-
oretically possible that, for each of the diﬀerent visual regions or
mechanisms, there is a diﬀerent type of neural correlate of beauty
perception, it seems more economical to propose a single and
common neural mechanism, which I call the beauty-responsive
mechanism in my model.
By postulating a general beauty-responsive mechanism, I do
not deny that there are general preferences for particular types
of stimulus properties in the diﬀerent visual domains. For exam-
ple, in the color domain, people in Western cultures generally
prefer bluish and greenish colors and dislike brownish ones
(Yanulevskaya et al., 2012; Mallon et al., 2014), possibly because
blue and green can be associated with pleasant scenes (lakes, sky,
forest, ﬂowers) while disgusting things like excrements or rotten
food have a brownish color (Palmer and Schloss, 2010). Despite
this general color preference, an etching printed in a brownish
color can nevertheless be a beautiful piece of art. As another
example of domain-speciﬁc beauty, people across cultures prefer
particular features in female and male faces (symmetry, smooth
skin, particular facial proportions etc.; Rhodes, 2006). Not all
images of attractive faces, however, are necessarily great artworks
and display a beautiful artistic composition. Figure 3 shows an
image of an attractive average face that most observers would not
FIGURE 3 | (A) Average faces generated by morphing and superimposing
veridical images of female faces. (B) Portrait of a Young Women by H.
Baldung Grien, about 1513–1515. (C) Portrait of the Artists’s Mother at the
Age of 63 by A. Dürer, 1514. The figure illustrates the difference between the
(domain-specific) face attractiveness (in A,B) and the (general) intrinsic beauty
of artworks (in B,C). Note that the drawing in (C) is beautiful, despite the fact
that the depicted face is not attractive. The image in (A) was reproduced with
kind permission by © Martin Gründl (www.beautycheck.de, accessed January
28, 2015).
classify as an artwork (Figure 3A), a somewhat attractive face in
a beautiful artwork (Figure 3B) and an ugly face in a beautiful
artwork (Figure 3C). These images demonstrate that facial attrac-
tiveness and the formal beauty of an artwork are not the same (see
also Hayn-Leichsenring et al., 2013). Typically, domain-speciﬁc
beauty, such as facial attractiveness, depends on what it depicted
in an image while the formal beauty of artworks does not.
What is the nature of the beauty-responsive mechanism
and which stimulus features activate it?
If the same beauty-responsive mechanism operates in diﬀerent
cortical areas, it seems reasonable to assume that this mechanism
relates to some basic and general principles of neural processing.
Basic mechanisms of information processing are, for example,
long-range spatial inhibition, short-term adaptation, facilitation,
long-term potentiation and depression, predictive coding or eﬃ-
cient (sparse) coding of information. Although it is at present
unclear which – if any – of these mechanisms correlate with
the perception of beauty, preliminary observations point in the
following directions.
First, evidence is accumulating that large subsets of artworks
of Western and Far Eastern provenance share a scale-invariant
Fourier spectrum that has a spatial frequency proﬁle similar
to those of complex natural scenes (Graham and Field, 2007;
Redies et al., 2007b; Alvarez-Ramirez et al., 2008). Accordingly,
Western artists tend to portrait faces with the scale-invariant
spectrum of natural scenes although photographs of faces have
a diﬀerent spectrum with a lower proportion of higher spa-
tial frequencies than natural scenes (Redies et al., 2007a). Scale
invariance indicates that the Fourier spectrum does not change
as one zooms in and out of an image. The similarity between
details of an image and the entire image has also been assessed
more directly by comparing histograms of oriented luminance
gradients at diﬀerent levels of image detail (Amirshahi et al.,
2012). With this approach, a relatively high degree of self-
similarity was found for images of artworks and images of nat-
ural patterns (Redies et al., 2012). Particularly striking is the
fact that the American abstract expressionist, Jackson Pollock,
painted images with a fractal (self-similar) structure (Taylor,
2002; Taylor et al., 2011) even before Mandelbrot (1975) dis-
covered the concept of fractality. Although J. Pollock was aware
of the general visual resemblance of his paintings with natural
patterns, he did not characterize this similarity in any explicit
detail.
The similarity between artworks and natural patterns is of
interest also because, like artworks, natural scenes can be beau-
tiful, although perhaps not as profoundly as artworks. Several
neurophysiological and psychological studies indicate that the
mammalian visual system is adapted in evolution and ontoge-
netic development to process complex natural stimuli with a
relatively high degree of eﬃciency compared to other types of
stimuli (Olshausen and Field, 1996; Párraga et al., 2000; Vinje and
Gallant, 2000; Simoncelli and Olshausen, 2001). It has therefore
been speculated that beautiful artworks are created so that they
can be processed in a way that relates to the coding of natural
stimuli (Redies, 2007; Graham and Redies, 2010). Such a per-
ceptual resonance between artworks and the visual system might
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elicit a speciﬁc pattern or state of neural activity in the visual
system when an individual is observing a beautiful artwork. At
present, however, it remains unclear what this particular state or
resonant pattern of neural activity might be.
Second, complexity is another visual feature that has been
linked to aesthetic preference. Although there are many ways
to deﬁne visual complexity, most studies agree that an interme-
diate degree of complexity is preferred for artworks on average
(Berlyne, 1974; Forsythe et al., 2011; Redies et al., 2012). For
example, Taylor and colleagues systematically modiﬁed the fractal
dimension, a measure that reﬂects visual complexity, in natural
and synthetic visual patterns. They showed that patterns with a
fractal dimension of about 1.3–1.5 are generally preferred over
patterns with a higher or lower fractal dimension (for a review,
see Taylor et al., 2011). However, the range of complexity values
of artworks is relatively large (Braun et al., 2013).
A third and unexpected ﬁnding is that some of the statis-
tical regularities investigated, speciﬁcally the spatial frequency
spectrum and the oriented gradients in an image, are relatively
evenly distributed across the orientations in artworks, i.e., they
are isotropic (Koch et al., 2010; Braun et al., 2013; Melmer et al.,
2013). The signiﬁcance of this ﬁnding remains unclear. Some nat-
ural scenes and natural patterns possess a similarly high degree of
isotropy.
Last but not least, a fourth formal feature of artworks is pic-
torial balance with respect to the center of an image, although
this feature is more diﬃcult to deﬁne in physical terms. Arnheim
(1982) pointed out the importance of the image center for artistic
composition. McManus et al. (2011) described evidence that the
center-of-mass of luminance values was close to geometrical lines
(horizontal, vertical, and oblique) in high-quality photographs.
When Locher et al. (2005) studied the contribution of color to the
subjective center of balance in original and modiﬁed Mondrians,
they found the center closer to the geometrical center in original
Mondrians than in modiﬁed ones.
I must point out, however, that none of the visual regularities
of artworks mentioned above are necessary or suﬃcient to induce
an aesthetic experience. For example, highly self-similar or frac-
tal images can be produced by computer programs (Lee and
Mumford, 1999) or by shuﬄing the phase of Fourier-transformed
fractal images. The resulting images look vaguely natural, but
they are not very beautiful. Likewise, an intermediate degree of
complexity does not guarantee that a stimulus is beautiful. The
“signiﬁcant form” of beautiful artworks postulated by Bell (1914)
therefore remains enigmatic up to date.
In summary, some of the evidence available to date suggests
that the visual structure of beautiful artworks possibly reﬂects an
adaptation of the human visual system to the natural environ-
ment. In Section “Form,” I have argued that images of natural
stimuli and beautiful artworks represent a subset of all possi-
ble images, which can be readily encoded and processed by the
human visual system. Here, I go beyond this claim and propose
that beautiful images are a subgroup of all man-made images.
Beautiful images are special because they possess a speciﬁc form
that harbors the potential to induce a resonant aesthetic state
of neural activation in the beholder’s visual system. This state
reﬂects basic principles of neural processing and can be induced
in various brain regions. Hence, visual art may embrace all
modalities of visual perception.
Opponents of the notion that beautiful artworks have a spe-
ciﬁc form will only be convinced of its existence if this form is
unequivocally demonstrated. Understandably, many researchers
remain doubtful because attempts to describe this form in con-
crete terms have failed so far. However, this failure may be due
to the fact that basic mechanisms of neural processing, such as
eﬃcient processing or sparse coding, are not readily accessible to
cognitive introspection. In the same vein, the compositional rules
for creating beautiful artworks also seem to be beyond the reach
of cognition or everyday language. For this reason, it has been
impossible to precisely deﬁne what renders an image beautiful
in common language. Rather, we will rely on studies of formal
and abstract physical image properties as well as neurophysiolog-
ical recordings from the visual system to investigate in the future
which image properties activate the putative beauty-responsive
mechanism.
Cognitive Coding and Processing
Not only the perceptual abilities, but also the cognitive facilities of
the human brain are limited. Like every other organ, the human
brain is the result of an adaptation to the natural environment
of our ancestors. Therefore, in the Darwinian sense, the neural
substrates of cognition served speciﬁc functions in the survival of
the human species, even if the original suitability of some of the
cognitive functions is no longer apparent in our modern world.
As pointed out by Dissanayake (2008), culture may have a bio-
logical basis also and humans are born with a preparedness to
become cultural. This inborn preparedness manifests itself, for
example, in language acquisition or face learning in early infancy
(Tomasello, 1999). Nevertheless, for the purpose of the present
discussion, it seems feasible to distinguish between biological
(perceptual) mechanisms and cultural determinants of aesthetic
experience.
The cultural environment determines our language, social
behavior, aesthetic preferences and so forth. Cultural practices
change slowly over the years and vary across cultures. Cognitive
processing is shaped also by the experience gained during the
lifetime of an individual. In mymodel, I distinguish between cog-
nitive coding and cognitive processing. With regard to the art
viewer, cognitive coding refers to the acquisition of explicit infor-
mation about what is depicted in an artwork, the circumstances
under which the artwork was created, the way it is presented
and so on. Knowledge relevant for the cognitive evaluation of
an artwork may also be stored in and retrieved from mem-
ory, based on previous exposure to art (Figure 1). Cognitive
processing refers to the conscious usage of this information in
order to understand the meaning of the artwork and the inten-
tions of an artist. The artist, in turn, purposely uses visual signs
or symbols that convey explicit content and meaning in his
artworks.
As already mentioned in Section “Content and Context,” the
cultural context and the previous personal experience of the
artists are of paramount importance for the creation of art-
works, especially for their content. Cultural and personal factors
play an important role also when humans observe artworks.
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Because both the cultural environment and the interaction of
an individual with this environment are highly variable within
a society, the cultural experience of artists and art viewers alike
is always intertwined with the special individual viewpoint of a
person.
There are abundant descriptions and models on how contex-
tual factors determine the creation of artworks and the aesthetic
experience when observing artworks. The issue is also central to
art history and the literature in this ﬁeld is far too vast to be
reviewed here. Two exemplary contextual theories in the ﬁeld of
empirical aesthetics are the multistage psychological model by
Leder et al. (2004; revised in Leder and Nadal, 2014) and the
psycho-historical framework by Bullot and Reber (2013).
In the present model (Figure 1), the diﬀerent contextual fac-
tors that contribute to the evaluation of the content of artworks
are incorporated in the form of the personal cultural ﬁlter (Redies,
2007). If the cognitive and cultural settings of the ﬁlter are com-
patible with the contextual information that is provided for a
given artwork, the ﬁlter is permissive and allows for the success-
ful processing of the contextual information, eventually leading
to the cognitive mastering of the artwork’s content and context. If
the setup of the cultural ﬁlter does not contain the cultural exper-
tise to understand the artist’s intentions, cognitive mastering fails.
Such a failure may induce a re-evaluation process that leads to
self-evaluation and self-change, personal growth and eventual
return to cognitive mastering with a new set of expectations
(Lasher et al., 1983; Pelowski and Akiba, 2011).
Joint Activation of Perceptual and Cognitive
Channels
In the above sections, I described how the external information
associated with an artwork is encoded by the nervous system and
processed in the brain along two separate streams, which encode
and process the perceptual and cognitive attributes of the art-
work. In this section, I will explain how the two streams interact.
As a central mechanism of the model, I propose that, in order to
trigger an aesthetic experience, both channels must fulﬁll a spe-
ciﬁc condition (red dotted circle in Figure 1). The model thereby
combines elements of formalist theories and contextual theories
of art. The necessary conditions are:
• Perceptual processing: the neural mechanism responsive to
beauty is activated in the visual brain region(s), in which the
processing of the visual stimulus takes place (perceptual res-
onance; see “What is the Nature of the Beauty-Responsive
Mechanism and Which Stimulus Features Activate It?”). It is
activated directly by intrinsic formal properties of artworks.
Processing is predominantly automatic, fast and proceeds in
a bottom–up direction.
• Cognitive processing: the personal cultural ﬁlter is permissive,
i.e., the content and context of the artwork are successfully
and positively evaluated, which results in cognitive mastering
(see “Cognitive Coding and Processing”). The personal cul-
tural ﬁlter is amental construct that is shaped by the experience
of an individual in a cultural context. Cognitive processing
is generally slower than perceptual processing. Top–down
mechanisms, which mediate expectations or involve the
retrieval of contextual information from memory, play an
important role; note that they are not explicitly indicated in
Figure 1.
Figures 4–10 illustrate how the model works for diﬀerent
types of visual stimuli. A detailed account of each case is provided
in the legends to the ﬁgures. In labeling the stimuli as beautiful or
not, I have tried to subjectively describe the putative judgment
of a wide audience. However, some people may disagree with my
labels, e.g., they may ﬁnd the paintings displayed in Figures 5 and
7 aesthetic.
In brief, if there is resonance in the perceptual channel of
the model, as well as mastering and positive evaluation in the
cognitive channel, an aesthetic experience is elicited (Figure 4).
If processing in one or both of the channels is unsuccessful
(Figures 5–7), there is no aesthetic experience. Strong emotions
of negative valence can partially or completely inhibit an aesthetic
experience (Figure 8).
Note that the examples described are not static but can change
over time. For example, individuals can change their cognitive
processing due to cultural adaptation. In the case of scandalous
but beautiful artworks, the response of art viewers can change
from outright rejection (Figure 6) to an aesthetic experience
(Figure 4), as the public grows familiar with novel styles of
art. Whether the beauty-responsive mechanism is also subject to
temporal modulation is less clear. The perception of beauty in
abstract artworks was recently shown to be subject to perceptual
contrast, which seems to correlate with speciﬁc image properties,
such as color measures (Mallon et al., 2014).More detailed studies
are necessary to investigate this question.
Predominant Activation of One Channel
In the following, I will discuss two special cases, where one of
the processing streams (perceptual of cognitive) dominates and
the other stream plays only a minor or no role in the aesthetic
experience.
First, some art viewers may choose tominimize cognitive eval-
uation while viewing art (predominant aesthetics of perception).
For example, it has been claimed that viewing Pollock’s paint-
ing Number 32 (Figure 9) can be a purely sensual experience
that is largely, if not completely, devoid of cognitive evaluation
(Greenberg, 1967). For most individuals, however, formal aspects
alone may not be suﬃcient to reach a full aesthetic experience
when viewing artworks; they may be compelled also by cogni-
tive factors, e.g., by realizing the revolutionary style of J. Pollock
(Rosenberg, 1952) or the high cost of his paintings. Because the
perceptual mechanisms of beauty perception do not changemuch
over time, aesthetics of perception is likely to be relatively stable.
What is the evidence that aesthetic experience can be induced
predominantly by perceptual processing when, at the same time,
cognitive processing is reduced? (i) Persons with dementia show a
remarkably stable preference for artworks despite their cognitive
decline in the course of the illness (Graham et al., 2013; Gretton
and ﬀytche, 2014). In patients with frontotemporal dementia,
artistic production can even be induced or enhanced in some
cases (Miller and Miller, 2013; Zaidel, 2014). (ii) Judgments
on global and holistic properties of artworks, such as balance,
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FIGURE 4 | Example of a beautiful artwork that can elicit an aesthetic
experience (Sunflowers by van Gogh, 1888). The beautiful form of this
painting activates the beauty-responsive mechanisms in the perceptual
processing stream (green arrows). Because van Gogh’s art style and life are
well-known to most persons who view this painting, mastering is possible in
the cognitive processing stream (purple arrows) so that the personal cultural
filter is permeable. Hence, both conditions for an aesthetic experience are
fulfilled.
FIGURE 5 | This painting (Mana Lisa by A. Schmidt) is a copy of the
Mona Lisa painting by Leonardo da Vinci (1503–1506). Because it is readily
recognized as a copy produced by an unskilled artist and the intentions of the
artist are not clear, there is no cognitive mastering for most individuals. Intrinsic
beauty is very limited and resonance in the perceptual processing channel is at
a low level, if not absent. The gray shading indicates unsuccessful perceptual
and cognitive processing. As a result, there is no aesthetic experience.
Reproduced with kind permission by © The Museum of Bad Art (MOBA), 2014.
symmetry, structural complexity, and structural arrangement can
be reached with presentation times of 50–100 ms, i.e., by gist
perception (Cupchik and Berlyne, 1979; Locher and Nagy, 1996;
Smith et al., 2006; Locher et al., 2007); this time period is proba-
bly too short for extensive cognitive deliberations. Global image
statistics that can be correlated with perception of scene gist,
such as spatial coherence, are encoded in the visual system within
the ﬁrst 100–150 ms after stimulus onset, indicating process-
ing by early visual areas (lateral geniculate nucleus or primary
visual cortex; Kreitler and Kreitler, 1984; Groen et al., 2013). (iii)
Some artists claimed that they followed unspeciﬁed or subcon-
scious abstract compositional rules while creating their artworks,
for example, Kandinsky (1912) and A. Dürer (Panofsky, 1943).
Malevich (1927), a pioneer of geometrical abstract art, stated that
reality, objects, meaning and context are irrelevant for his art-
works. (iv) Babies prefer to look at attractive faces, suggesting that
the preference for facial beauty is not driven by cognition but
may reﬂect an inborn mechanism of perception (Valenza et al.,
1996; Samuels et al., 2013). However, this eﬀect may be speciﬁc
for the face domain (see “Higher-Level Perceptual Processing”);
it is presently unknown whether there is a similar preference
for beautiful artworks. (v) Last but not least, in a psychological
experiment, Cupchik andWroblewski-Raya (1998) diﬀerentiated
between perceptive versus projective functions of art, as initially
proposed by Machotka (1979). Perceptive functions pertain to
the aesthetic structure of objects (style) while projective func-
tions relate to the observer’s own cognitive and emotional needs.
Participants who took amore personally distant view of the paint-
ings preferred the style over the narrative subject matter of the
artworks, while persons who found the paintings to be person-
ally meaningful, preferred the subject matter over the style. This
result demonstrates that viewers can shift between perceptual and
cognitive processing, depending on the context and their own
internal needs.
Second, many contemporary art experts argue that the concept
of beauty is largely abandoned in modern and post-modern art;
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FIGURE 6 | Example of scandalous art (Les Desmoiselles d’Avignon by
Picasso, 1907, © Succession Picasso/VG Bild-Kunst and Bonn, 2015).
The brothel scene depicts five prostitutes. The painting is an early cubist
painting and stands for a radical departure from conventional European
painting style. The gray shading indicates unsuccessful cognitive processing.
At the time when the painting was first presented, it caused a scandal and
was rejected by the public. Even some of Picasso’s close friends were
shocked and outraged. Cognitive mastering was impossible for most of
Picasso’s contemporaries, preventing an aesthetic experience. As the public
grew more familiar with cubism and modern art, cognitive mastering became
possible and art viewers learned to appreciate the intrinsic beauty of this
painting. Today, the painting is considered a milestone of 20th century
art and enables an aesthetic experience similar to that illustrated in
Figure 4.
FIGURE 7 | Example of a not-so-beautiful painting (Monochrome by
Redies, 2014). The author produced this painting on the occasion of the
present article. It is not a counterfeit of Yves Klein’s (1928–1962) monochrome
paintings. Note that the color of the painting is different from Klein’s standard
ultramarine blue. Also, it was the artist’s intention to break with the tradition of
purely monochrome paintings by superimposing a highly innovative white spot.
Even if this explanation might allow some readers to cognitively master the
context of this painting, its intrinsic beauty remains negligible. As a result, there
will be no aesthetic experience for most individuals. In the model, the gray
shading indicates unsuccessful perceptual processing. The occasional reader,
who does have an aesthetic experience with this or Yves Klein’s paintings, may
fall under the case illustrated in Figure 10.
FIGURE 8 | Example of an artwork with strongly negative emotional valence (¡Grande hazaña! Con muertos! Plate no. 39 from Desastres de la
Guerra, 1810 –1814, by F. de Goya). Despite the formal beauty of this etching and the pacifist intentions of the artist, this cruel war scene can induce strongly
aversive emotions in the beholder, which will block aesthetic experience in most individuals.
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FIGURE 9 | Example of an abstract expressionist painting (Number
32 by Pollock, 1950, © Pollock-Krasner Foundation/VG Bild-Kunst
and Bonn, 2015). Taylor (2002) showed that Pollock created fractal
(self-similar) structures in his drip paintings. Although Pollock was aware of
the similarities of his paintings and natural forms in general, he did not
know about fractals, which were discovered only later by Mandelbrot
(1975). The art critic Greenberg (1967) argued that the artistic quality of
paintings like those of Pollock can be valued exclusively on the basis of
their form. Following this formalist argument, some art beholders can
enjoy the beauty of artworks with few or no cognitive reflections about
the intentions of the artist and the context of the creation of the
paintings. In the model, this is realized by the decrease of cognitive
processing (i.e., predominant aesthetics of perception), which is the
opposite of the case shown in Figure 10.
FIGURE 10 | Example of a modern artwork that lacks visual beauty
(Fountain by Duchamps, 1917, © Succession Marcel Duchamp/VG
Bild-Kunst and Bonn, 2015). Many art historians consider this porcelain
urinal a major landmark artwork of modern art. Its importance in art history
stems not so much from the intrinsic beauty of its form, but from the fact
that the artist transcended traditional artistic principles and thereby set the
stage for modern conceptual art. In the process of establishing
(post-)modern art, many artists abandoned the concept of beauty as a
prerequisite for artworks. In the model, this is reflected in the decrease or
absence of perceptual processing. As a result, aesthetic experience is
determined largely by the content and context of the artwork (i.e.,
predominant aesthetics of cognition), irrespective of its form.
instead, the aesthetic impact of artworks is thought to depend on
the intention of the artist, the art historical context of the art-
work’s creation and the appraisal by art experts (see “Content
and Context”). For example, in the model of aesthetic experi-
ence by Leder et al. (2004; modiﬁed in Leder and Nadal, 2014),
an aesthetic episode requires cognitive mastering and positive
evaluation of the intentions of the artist and the circumstances,
under which an artwork was created and is presented. The exper-
tise of the art beholder supports this evaluative process because
it sustains the explicit processing of social, historical and other
types of relevant information as well as the beholder’s interest
and cognitive stimulation by the artwork. Bullot and Reber (2013)
suggested that any explanation and classiﬁcation of psychologi-
cal responses to art must be based on the study of art-historical
information, besides psychological factors. The art critic Gopnik
(2012) goes even further and contends that the role of the art
critic is to instruct the general public on how to understand and
appreciate artworks.
The above notion has been criticized as parochial and eli-
tist (Redies, 2014). It seems parochial because not all modern,
post-modern or contemporary artworks lack visual beauty. On
the contrary, some (post-)modern artworks are highly beautiful
in the sense that their visual sensual qualities tend to dominate
the aesthetic experience by most individuals (aesthetics of per-
ception; Figure 1). Examples are artworks by V. Kandinsky, P.
Picasso, J. Miro, J. Pollock, and others. Moreover, artists like
M. Rothko, B. Newman, and A. Gottlieb have advanced for-
malist concepts in their art (Greenberg, 1955; Dowling, 2014).
According to them, the inherent visual quality of their artworks
determines their aesthetic value. Moreover, it is elitist to claim
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that experts enjoy artworks at a generally higher level than non-
experts because of their superior factual knowledge or cognitive
abilities (Fitch and Westphal-Fitch, 2013).
Despite these caveats, there is no doubt that many 20th/21th
century artworks are less reliant on visual beauty, and that they
can nevertheless evoke an aesthetic experience in some experts,
based on cognitive mastering and evaluation. In aesthetics of cog-
nition, “the challenge of art is mainly driven by a need for under-
standing” (Leder et al., 2004). One of the prototypical examples
of this type of art is M. Duchamp’s Fountain (Figure 10). Note
that visual stimuli that are considered artworks at a given time
can loose their art status if the favorable conditions for cogni-
tive mastering are no longer given at another point in art history
or at another place in the cultural environment. As a conse-
quence, aesthetics of cognition comes along with some degree of
momentariness.
It may seem contradictory that, on the one hand, the model
(Figure 1) requires activation of both channels for an aesthetic
experience in the general case, and that, on the other hand, the
predominant activation of one channel seems to suﬃce in the
extreme cases of aesthetic experiences described above. While
this may be viewed as a conceptual weakness of the model, note
that the extreme cases do not require additional modeling but
derive from parts of the model. The model is thus ﬂexible with
regard to individual diﬀerences, which are so conspicuous in art
perception.
Emotional Processing
Emotional processing is generally considered to be another
important component of aesthetic perception (Jacobsen, 2004;
Leder et al., 2004; Chatterjee and Vartanian, 2014; Leder and
Nadal, 2014; Silva, 2014). Emotions can play a role both during
the creation of artworks and their viewing. Artists communicate
their emotions through the artworks to the beholder. Artworks
can induce basic (primary) emotions, such as happiness, melan-
choly, disgust, fear, anxiety, both by their perceptual properties
and by their content, and they do so in a particularly eﬀective
manner. However, there is general agreement in the literature that
aesthetic experience is not one of the primary emotions. A well-
known version of this notion is the concept of “disinterested
pleasure” by Kant (1790). It is still debated and perhaps a mat-
ter of deﬁnition whether the aesthetic experience can be regarded
as a speciﬁc emotion or aﬀectual state. For example, Leder et al.
(2004) distinguish aesthetic emotion and aesthetic judgment as
two separate outcomes of aesthetic processing. Other authors
even consider emotions as central to artistic activity (Silva, 2014)
or proposed that the role of artworks is to express emotions (for
a review, see Shimamura, 2014).
In my model, primary emotions that are expressed in art-
works can have a modulatory eﬀect on the aesthetic experience
of the beholder. Both the perceptual processing and the contex-
tual processing may induce emotions (Figure 1). For example, the
perception of bright and saturated blue and yellow colors in art-
works may enhance aesthetic experience, while brownish colors
may induce aversion in art beholders and thus cause a decrease of
aesthetic experience in general (Yanulevskaya et al., 2012; Palmer
et al., 2013; Mallon et al., 2014). Moreover, as another example,
people generally prefer everyday objects with curved contours
to objects with sharp-angled contours or pointed features (Bar
and Neta, 2007). Emotions induced by image content may also
modulate aesthetic experience. For example, most people show
a fearful emotion in response to images of spiders and snakes
and this fear represents an inborn mechanism (for a review, see
Öhman, 2008). In extreme cases, particularly gruesome or dis-
gusting visual scenes induce feelings of repulsion and disgust that
can block aesthetic experience altogether, for example, scenes of
war (Figure 8).
However, emotional processing of positive valence is not a
prerequisite for aesthetic experience and the extent, to which
emotions can aﬀect the aesthetic preference for artworks,
varies between individuals (Konecni and Sargent-Pollock, 1977).
Likewise, negative valence of emotions does not necessarily mean
that aesthetic experience is abolished in everyone. In particular,
some music listeners enjoy music even if it evokes sadness; in
these listeners, the liking of sad music has been associated with
particular character traits (Vuoskoski et al., 2012). In conclusion,
the experience of emotions may modulate aesthetic experience
but it is not a necessary or suﬃcient condition to induce it.
Aesthetic Experience
The ﬁnal stage of the model is the aesthetic experience, which
takes place if the two processing modalities (perceptual and
cognitive) meet the speciﬁc provisions outlined above (see
“Joint Activation of Perceptual and Cognitive Channels” and
“Predominant Activation of One Channel”).
Recent brain imaging studies demonstrated that aesthetic
experience in diﬀerent sensory or cognitive domains, for exam-
ple, in visual art, music, gustation/olfaction, touch and even
mathematics, leads to the activation of a similar set of brain
regions. These regions include the orbitofrontal cortex, a brain
region associated with the reward system and moral judgments
(for reviews, see Brown and Dissanayake, 2009; Avram et al.,
2013; Ishizu and Zeki, 2013; Chatterjee and Vartanian, 2014;
Vartanian and Skov, 2014; Zeki et al., 2014). Another region,
the anterior insula, was identiﬁed in a meta-analysis of 93
neuroimaging studies across four diﬀerent modalities (Brown
et al., 2011). Because both regions receive visceral aﬀerents, the
authors speculated that aesthetic appreciation was originally
associated with objects such as food and was later co-opted
for the experience of artworks in social contexts. Last but not
least, some of the brain regions that are activated by observing
artworks are associated with the default mode network, a set of
regions that are active during rest and self-referential thought;
this ﬁnding may correlate to the feeling of being touched “from
within” by artworks (Vessel et al., 2013).
Although the activation of the above-mentioned regions
seems to correlate with aesthetic experience across domains, their
functional mapping may contribute little to our understanding of
what is special about beautiful stimuli and how these special char-
acteristics are processed in the brain. By analogy, studying the
motor brain areas that control the muscles active when a person
is laughing would add little to our understanding of what is funny
about jokes. In this sense, it can be questioned whether the uni-
versal essence of aesthetic experience lies in the activation of these
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regions, as proposed by Zeki (2013). Rather, these brain regions
may represent a common endpoint where more widespread
mechanisms of aesthetics converge from diﬀerent sensory and
cognitive systems in the brain.
Implications of the Model and General
Discussion
Potential Role of Beautiful Art in Social
Bonding
To understand the relevance of the parallel (perceptual and cog-
nitive) processing streams, it may be helpful to reﬂect upon the
role of art in pre-modern, aboriginal societies, the social struc-
ture of which resembles that of our human ancestors who lived at
the time when art practice originated in the human lineage about
30,000 years ago (Valladas et al., 2001). Descriptions of art prac-
tice in such small-scale societies suggest that art promotes social
bonding between the members of a group of pre-modern people
(Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1988). In a similar vein, Dissanayake (2008) pro-
posed that, in human evolution, art served the adaptive function
of reinforcing sociality, enhancing cooperation and contribut-
ing to social cohesion and continuity. Brown and Dissanayake
(2009) argued that this bonding function of art practice, espe-
cially when carried out in conjunction with ritual ceremonies, is
probably more basic than other functions proposed in the ﬁeld
of evolutionary aesthetics (Dissanayake, 2007), for example the
promotion of mating opportunity through the display of hon-
est signals of reproductive ﬁtness (Voland, 2003) or the aesthetic
preference of early humans for certain natural habitats (savannah
hypothesis, Orians, 1986). In this context, it is of interest that the
neural correlates of aesthetic experience partially coincide with a
neural network in the brain that is also involved in moral judg-
ments (Zaidel and Nadal, 2011; Avram et al., 2013); this linkage
may be the basis of the beauty-is-good stereotype (Tsukiura and
Cabeza, 2011).
In the model, social bonding is based on the percep-
tual processing of beautiful form (see “Perceptual Coding and
Processing”), which is postulated to be universal among all cul-
tures (green lines in Figure 11). Social bonding comes about if
the members of a group enjoy beautiful visual displays such as
artworks together, for example in ceremonies. Beauty may thus
serve as a cultural “glue” for social bonding. Being universally
recognized, however, it is unspeciﬁc with respect to cultural iden-
tity. In general, social bonding takes place between persons who
belong to the same group but not between members of diﬀerent
cultural groups. The mechanism responsible for social segrega-
tion and cultural identity is the personal cultural ﬁlter (purple
circles in Figure 11). The ﬁlter is permissive if and only if the
beholder is familiar with the artwork’s content and can under-
stand the context of its creation and presentation. This is likely
to be the case if he is a member of the same group (for exam-
ple, group B in Figure 11). If he is a member of another group
(group A or group C), he will be ignorant of some of the cultural
details of group B. As a result, cognitive evaluation of the artwork
is not possible and the cultural ﬁlter remains blocked so that aes-
thetic experience fails and there is no social bonding. Therefore,
FIGURE 11 | The role of beautiful artworks in group-specific social
bonding. Bonding is mediated by a combination of two concurrent
mechanisms. It is induced by the activation of a universal perceptual
mechanism by beautiful visual stimuli (beauty-responsive mechanism; green
lines), but only if the beholder is tuned to the cognitive attributes of the
stimulus (cultural filter; purple circles). In this way, social bonding takes place
between members sharing a specific culture, but not between members of
different cultural groups.
the role of cognitive processing in the model is to promote the
bonding between members of the same group, but to inhibit the
bonding between members of diﬀerent social groups. A mod-
ulatory eﬀect of primary emotions on aesthetic perception (see
“Emotional Processing”) seems plausible because social bonding
constitutes a positive reinforcement of social interactions that
would be adversely aﬀected by negative emotions in general. In
modern (large-scale) societies, which each produce their charac-
teristic cultural artifacts, including artworks, these mechanisms
may still be in place.
Does the Beauty-Responsive Mechanism
Differ between Individuals?
Because cognitive processing depends on the individual exposure
to the cultural environment, the personal cultural ﬁlter varies
to a great extent between individuals. It is less clear, however,
whether individuals also diﬀer in the extent, to which the beauty-
responsive mechanism reacts to beautiful artworks. In Section
“What is the Nature of the Beauty-Responsive Mechanism and
Which Stimulus Features Activate It?” I argued that the beauty-
responsive mechanism relates to basic ways of neural processing
and is universal amongst humans. Can such a mechanism pos-
sibly diﬀer quantitatively between individuals? Results for other
domains of social recognition suggest that the answer to this
question might be aﬃrmative. For example, face recognition is
a universal psychological mechanism among humans. The neural
correlates of face recognition have been studied extensively. Like
for the perception of beauty, there is evidence that both inborn
universal mechanisms and culturally determined factors (e.g., the
other-race eﬀect) play a role. It is also clear that human diﬀer
in their ability to recognize and memorize faces, ranging from
deﬁcits (called prosopagnosia) to super-recognizers, who per-
form considerably better than average in face recognition (Russell
et al., 2009; Wilmer et al., 2012). Other traits of social recogni-
tion, for example, autistic traits, are thought to vary widely in the
general population also (Constantino and Todd, 2003; Robinson
et al., 2011). Both conditions are subject to genetic predisposition.
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It is therefore possible also that individuals diﬀer in their ability
to perceive visual beauty. Indeed, such diﬀerences are suggested
by the widely varying views of people on how important beauty
is for aesthetic perception, ranging from negligible to essential.
However, to date, little is known about the extent of such individ-
ual diﬀerences. In order to study them, reliable tests with suitable
stimuli must be developed ﬁrst (for example, see Wilson and
Chatterjee, 2005; Wilmer et al., 2012).
A related question is whether, in general, artists and art view-
ers diﬀer in their ability to perceive beauty. I speculate that this
does not necessarily have to be the case. Usually, artists create
artworks under a constant feedback between the emerging art-
work and their own visual system. The unique skill of artists
might lie in their ability to create images that induce a beauty-
related, resonant state in the visual system of human beholders.
To create beautiful art, artists must have the technical skills, visual
sensitivity and mental imagination to predict which steps in the
production of an artwork bring them closer to a maximal activa-
tion of the beauty-responsive mechanism. The diﬀerence between
an artist and art beholders may thus lie in the artist’s creativity,
imagination and skills rather than in the extent, to which he or
she perceives beauty in artworks.
Comparison with Other Models
The present model follows previous suggestions that aesthetic
experience is based on the triad of perception, cognition and
emotion (Leder et al., 2004; Chatterjee and Vartanian, 2014). In
a previously proposed multi-stage model, which was developed
primarily to explain modern and contemporary art (Leder et al.,
2004; Leder and Nadal, 2014), perceptual processing begins at
low levels of the model. It is followed by cognitive processing
of style, content and context at higher levels, eventually lead-
ing to cognitive mastering, understanding and evaluation, which
are based mainly on acquired expertise. In contrast to such hier-
archical processing (see also Locher et al., 2007), the present
model assumes parallel and independent processing of percep-
tual aspects of artworks, which are universal among humans, and
cognitive aspects, which depend on individual experience and
cultural context. The two processing streams converge at the level
of aesthetic experience. The seeming conﬂict between perceptual
and cognitive processing is resolved by assuming that both types
of processing must be successful in order to elicit an aesthetic
experience in the general case (see “Joint Activation of Perceptual
and Cognitive Channels”). Previously, Sheridan and Gardner
(2012) argued that psychological studies of the arts should not
be restricted to bio-psychological universals but also take into
account culture and individual diﬀerences as a modulatory inﬂu-
ence to account for the full richness of artistic production and
aesthetic preferences. Other authors have been less speciﬁc about
how to integrate perceptual universals and contextual dependen-
cies of art perception (Jacobsen, 2006; Chatterjee and Vartanian,
2014).
The role of emotions in the present model is amodulatory one.
In the Leder et al. (2004) model, aﬀective evaluation occurs con-
tinuously and in parallel to the processing of explicit information,
leading to an aesthetic emotion in addition to aesthetic judgment
as outputs from their model. A close interplay between perceptual
processes and emotions is also pivotal to the predictive coding
model of visual art proposed by Van de Cruys and Wagemans
(2011). In their model, artists destroy initial predictions of the
art viewers who then feel rewarded after recovering predictable
patterns again on a diﬀerent level; reward is thus derived from
the transition from a state of uncertainty to a state of increased
predictability.
Compared to the previous models, the present model does not
necessarily lead to more numerous or more speciﬁc predictions.
However, the model leads to a set of speciﬁc predictions that is
diﬀerent from previous models, especially with regard to the role
of beauty and its relation to cognition in aesthetic experience.
For example, the present model makes predictions on the pos-
sible nature of the putative beauty-responsive mechanism and
its localization in the brain, inter-individual diﬀerences in aes-
thetic experience, the diﬀerence between the beautiful form of
visual stimuli and more domain-speciﬁc visual preferences, the
modulatory role of emotions, and the evolutionary origin of aes-
thetic experience and animal aesthetics (see above and below).
In a young ﬁeld of research like experimental aesthetics, where a
sizeable body of data is still missing, it is good to have a diver-
sity of models rather than a single one because it is important
to keep an open mind for all types of possible research questions
(see Introduction). The results from future experiments will tell
us which of the diﬀerent models has the highest predictive power.
Application of the Model to Other Areas and
Domains of Aesthetics
The present model was designed to describe and explain aesthetic
experiences in response to visual artworks. Can the model be
applied to a wider array of aesthetic phenomena? To answer this
question, I will consider four types of extensions of the model.
First, for most people, the aesthetic evaluation of artworks
is a rare event in everyday life. More frequently, an individual
encounters other types of complex visual stimuli that may be
beautiful to varying degrees, such as clothing, advertisements,
architecture, design etc. The model can be applied also to these
types of visual stimuli. In particular, the interacting roles of
beauty and contextual (cultural) factors in promoting cultural
identity and bonding (Figure 11) is evident for aesthetic expe-
riences that are subject to fashion trends, such as for clothing and
design. Interestingly, the statistical image properties of artworks
were shown to overlap to a large degree with those of adver-
tisements and images of architecture in Western culture (Braun
et al., 2013). These types of images and other naturally occurring
images are relatively complex and possess a nearly scale-invariant
Fourier spectrum (i.e., power-law behavior of their spatial fre-
quency spectrum) in general (for a review, see Simoncelli and
Olshausen, 2001).
Second, more simple, man-made visual stimuli rarely occur
in our natural environment in isolation. They include geomet-
rical forms (McManus, 1980), simple graphic patterns (Jacobsen
and Höfel, 2002) or large ﬁelds of homogeneous color (Palmer
and Schloss, 2010). These stimuli generally possess other types
of image statistics, as demonstrated for images of regular text
(Melmer et al., 2013). The human visual system is adapted to pro-
cess images with natural scene statistics in a particularly eﬃcient
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way (see “Form”), but it may respond in a diﬀerent way to images
with non-natural image statistics. For example, it has been shown
that artiﬁcial images that can induce visual discomfort in human
observers deviate from the scale-invariant Fourier spectrum of
natural scenes (Juricevic et al., 2010; O’Hare and Hibbard, 2011).
It is therefore possible that the perception of beauty in naturally
looking stimuli, such as beautiful artworks, diﬀers from the visual
preference for other types of stimuli, such as simple, highly geo-
metrical patterns. In how far the present model can be applied to
such stimuli remains to be studied.
Third, some visual stimuli are beautiful in a more special
(domain-speciﬁc) sense, such as images of human faces, human
bodies or landscapes. Figure 3 illustrates the diﬀerence between
the beauty (attractiveness) of faces and the beauty (global com-
position) of artworks. On the one hand, it is well established
that facial attractiveness is based both on universal (inborn) per-
ceptual mechanisms and cultural inﬂuences. In this respect, the
perceptual mechanisms of facial attractiveness and beauty in art-
works follow a similar ontogenetic pattern. On the other hand, it
is also clear that facial attractiveness is dependent on a particular
class of objects (i.e., human faces) while the beauty of artworks
does not depend on the content depicted in the artworks (see
“What is the Nature of the Beauty-Responsive Mechanism and
Which Stimulus Features Activate It?”). Evidently, face attractive-
ness is relevant for mate selection, as is the beauty of the human
body. It is unclear why the image statistics of natural scenes
may have generalized to be associated with content-independent
beauty while those of faces have not. The preference of artists for
speciﬁc image properties (Redies et al., 2007a) shows that beauty
in artworks diﬀers from content-dependent (facial) beauty not
only behaviorally but also in terms of physical stimulus prop-
erties. Nevertheless, the beauty of landscapes and the beauty of
artworks are not identical. By creating artworks, artists can imple-
ment other, as of yet unknown regularities beyond natural scenes
statistics, perhaps to induce a deeper or more complete sense of
beauty. In this way, artworks may reﬂect additional mechanisms
of neural processing intrinsic to the visual system, such as eﬃcient
coding (Redies, 2007).
Fourth, although the model was introduced for the visual
domain, it can be extended to aesthetic experiences in other
sensory domains. These domains diﬀer substantially along sev-
eral parameters of their processing architecture, but they may
also share commonalities (Jacobsen, 2014). For music percep-
tion, which contains relatively little semantic content, aesthetics
of perception and emotional arousal are particularly relevant.
In music, some universals have already been identiﬁed, such
as timekeeping during music performance (for a review, see
Palmer, 1997), pitch perception and harmonic relations (for a
review, see Koelsch, 2011). Egermann et al. (2015) found univer-
sal arousal responses to low-level acoustic characteristic of music
in a cross-cultural study of Pygmies and Canadians. However,
aesthetics of cognition may also play a role in music percep-
tion because, for example, music style depends on the cultural
environment and familiarity with style is an important factor in
the appreciation of music. In literature, aesthetics of cognition is
of paramount importance. Aesthetics of perception may express
itself in prosody, intonation, and rhyme. In Section “What is
the Nature of the Beauty-Responsive Mechanism and Which
Stimulus Features Activate It?” I speculated that the perception
of beauty is mediated by basic mechanisms of neural processing
that are widespread in the visual system. Following this notion, it
is possible that the same or similar basic mechanisms are imple-
mented also in the other sensory systems in the brain. If this
were true, one would expect similar types of beauty-related stim-
ulus structure, for example self-similar (fractal) patterns, across
sensory modalities. Indeed, fractal structure has been demon-
strated for particular types of music (Voss and Clarke, 1978;
Hsu and Hsu, 1990; Su and Wu, 2007; Brothers, 2009), but these
ﬁndings remain anecdotal and await a more systematic investi-
gation across diﬀerent types of music and cultures. In the area of
brain imaging, comparative studies of diﬀerent domains are more
advanced. For example, the activation of the medial orbitofrontal
cortex correlates with the perception of beauty in art, music and
even mathematical equations (Zeki et al., 2014), as well as the
goodness of moral judgments (Tsukiura and Cabeza, 2011). Last
but not least, one may ask whether the cognitive channel contains
analogs of the beauty-responsive perceptual mechanisms. If there
is beauty of cognition, does it have similar neural correlates in the
brain as the perception of visual beauty?
Other Implications of the Model
Provided that the model correctly represents the factors and
mechanisms that play a role in visual aesthetic experience, it has
the following additional implications:
(1) According to the model, the beauty-responsive mechanism
is implemented in several visual channels or brain regions,
which process diﬀerent aspects of visual information. Unlike
the ﬁnal aesthetic experience, which seems to activate a set of
restricted brain regions and neural networks (see “Aesthetic
Experience”), the neurophysiological correlate of beauty per-
ception may not be restricted to a single channel or a limited
number of brain regions. Moreover, if the beauty-responsive
mechanism reﬂects basic principles of neural processing,
such as eﬃcient coding (Redies, 2007), the activation (or inhi-
bition) of the involved neural circuits may take place at a
resolution below that of conventional methods to measure
brain activity, such as fMRT, MEG, or EEG. It is thus possi-
ble that such neural mechanisms escape conventional brain
imaging or neurophysiological methods.
(2) If perceptual processing of beauty and cognitive processing
of context and content take place along independent chan-
nels and in parallel, the beauty-responsive mechanism can be
activated even if cognitive processing fails and there is no aes-
thetic experience. Also, the beauty-responsive mechanisms
should be detectable independent of basic emotions, which
modulate aesthetic experience at a later processing stage in
the model (Figure 1).
(3) Can animals have an aesthetic experience? It seems reason-
able to assume that cognitive processing of cultural informa-
tion is not as complex in animals as in humans in general
(Tomasello, 1999), but cultural behavior has been observed at
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least in some species, for example, for whale songs (Mercado
et al., 2005; Cantor andWhitehead, 2013). Moreover, pigeons
can be trained to discriminate between art styles and between
children’s paintings that were classiﬁed as beautiful or ugly,
respectively, by adult human observers (Watanabe, 2011).
If perceptual processing of beauty is basic and universal
amongst humans, there is no good reason why this con-
cept should not be extended to animals (Welsch, 2004).
To prove that animals can appreciate beauty will be dif-
ﬁcult because we cannot communicate with them about
beauty or aesthetics. Nevertheless, we can search for neu-
ral mechanisms in animals that correspond to the neural
mechanisms associated with aesthetic experience in humans.
The demonstration of beauty-related brain functions in ani-
mals would be of great interest because it would give us
insight into the evolutionary origins of aesthetic experience.
Moreover, if humans and animals share beauty-responsive
mechanisms to some extent, this may explain why there
can be cross-species appreciation of beautiful patterns, e.g.,
the appreciation of elaborate bird plumage or bird songs by
humans.
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